Date of Award

Spring 5-2024

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Science (MS)

Department

Behavioral and Computational Economics

First Advisor

Daniel Kovenock

Second Advisor

David Porter

Third Advisor

Stephen Rassenti

Abstract

This study presents a novel exploration of the lottery Colonel Blotto game. This adaptation introduces the possibility of draws or ties, moving beyond the traditional winner-take-all framework. The inclusion of the possibility of a draw allows for a more realistic depiction of contests where players may arbitrarily split the value of a battlefield in the absence of a decisive victory. Our model is characterized by the number of battlefields, battlefield values that may vary across battlefields, but are symmetric across players, the distinct player shares of each battlefield value captured in the event of a draw, the potentially asymmetric budgets of the players and a parameter influencing the (endogenously determined) likelihood of a draw. Within this modified game structure, we derive the range of the underlying parameters for which there exists an interior solution and provide an analytic characterization of that solution. Additionally, we expand our analysis across the entire parameter space to determine the optimal resource allocation strategies when solutions are not interior (either some player’s complete budget is allocated to a battlefield, or a nonempty set of battlefields receives a zero allocation). Special cases corresponding to prominent models in the contest literature are examined and extensions explored.

DOI

10.36837/chapman.000599

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Available for download on Friday, May 01, 2026

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