Date of Award
Spring 5-2024
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Science (MS)
Department
Behavioral and Computational Economics
First Advisor
Dr. David Porter
Abstract
One of the objectives of two-sided matching mechanisms is to pair two groups of agents such that there is no incentive for pair deviation. The outcome of a match can significantly impact participants. While much of the existing research in this field addresses the matching with fixed quotas, this is not always applicable. We introduce the concept of slot stability, recognizing the potential motivation for organizations to modify their quotas after the match. We propose an algorithm designed to create stable and slot stable matches by employing flexible, endogenous quotas to address this issue.
DOI
10.36837/chapman.000597
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Gilmore, J. (2024). Match stability with a costly and flexible number of positions [Master's thesis, Chapman University]. Chapman University Digital Commons. https://doi.org/10.36837/chapman.000597