Date of Award
Spring 5-2020
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Science (MS)
Department
Behavioral and Computational Economics
First Advisor
Dr. David Porter
Second Advisor
Dr. Erik Kimbrough
Abstract
In this thesis we conduct a laboratory experiment to examine the preferences of sellers and buyers for the reserve price mechanism and test their rationalizability. We use a stylized independent private value environment, a second price auction institution and a first price auction institution to investigate if the preference is monetizable. We find that the revealed preference of the sellers does not translate on the aggregate level and partially on the individual level. Further, sellers who choose public reserve prices set higher reserve prices and achieve higher sales prices. Lastly, we find that buyers are willing to pay to obtain the reserve price information.
DOI
10.36837/chapman.000142
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Limberg, Philipp. “Rationalizing Mechanism Preference in Independent Private Value Auctions.” Master's thesis, Chapman University, 2020. https://doi.org/10.36837/chapman.000142