Document Type
Book
Publication Date
1-22-2016
Abstract
Most of the arguments usually appealed to in order to support the view that some abstraction principles are analytic depend on ascribing to them some sort of existential parsimony or ontological neutrality, whereas the opposite arguments, aiming to deny this view, contend this ascription. As a result, other virtues that these principles might have are often overlooked. Among them, there is an epistemic virtue which I take these principles to have, when regarded in the appropriate settings, and which I suggest to call ‘epistemic economy’. My purpose is to isolate and clarify this notion by appealing to some examples concerning the definition of natural and real numbers.
Recommended Citation
Panza, M. (2016). Abstraction and Epistemic Economy. In: Costreie, S. (eds) Early Analytic Philosophy - New Perspectives on the Tradition. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 80. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24214-9_17
Copyright
Springer
Included in
Logic and Foundations Commons, Logic and Foundations of Mathematics Commons, Other Mathematics Commons
Comments
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of a chapter accepted for publication in Sorin Costreie (Ed.), Early Analytic Philosophy - New Perspectives on the Tradition. This version may not exactly replicate the final published version. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24214-9_17