Document Type
Article
Publication Date
9-1-2021
Abstract
The inter-temporal resource allocation efficiency of a property rights-based common-pool resource system is challenged by a cost externality when one user’s extraction raises the extraction cost for others. This paper builds a dynamic resource allocation model to illustrate the efficiency loss from a standard property rights market. We then create a novel inter-temporal allocation mechanism that preserves dynamic efficiency. Our dynamic resource allocation mechanism includes an optimal planning stage where the agents collectively determine a binding extraction target for each period and a market stage where agents can exchange their extraction rights assigned within each period. The theoretical model demonstrates that our mechanism can achieve the socially optimal allocation in two specific environments. A numerical simulation of our mechanism for a general environment consistently tracks the social optimum and significantly outperforms the traditional property rights market.
Recommended Citation
Zhao, H. & Porter, D. (2021, Sept. 1). Dynamic resource allocation with cost externality. ESI Working Paper 21-19. https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/356/
Comments
ESI Working Paper 21-19