Document Type

Response or Comment

Publication Date

7-9-2026

Abstract

"In response, three different critiques were mounted: Dolega et al. [3] agree with our critique of Block’s distinction, but argue that we didn’t go far enough and should consider entirely discarding any notions of P vs. A (either as types of, or as conditions for, consciousness). Phillips [4] supports Block’s original distinction and questions whether our subtle conceptual shift really changes anything. Melloni et al. [5] raise concerns about how we define 'access', how our proposal might affect current theories of consciousness, and whether it is capable of inspiring novel empirical work. Here, we respond to these critiques to further clarify our conceptual framework (due to space limitations, we focus on the most crucial points, yet we welcome further discussion on other points elsewhere)."

Comments

NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, volume 30, issue 9, in 2026. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2026.06.003

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Copyright

Elsevier

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Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Available for download on Friday, July 09, 2027

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