Moderate Physical Perspectivalism

Authors

Emily Adlam, Chapman UniversityFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

12-10-2024

Abstract

Recent developments in the foundations of physics have given rise to a class of views suggesting that physically meaningful descriptions must always be relativized to a physical perspective. In this article, I distinguish between strong physical perspectivalism, which maintains that all facts must be relativized to a perspective, and moderate physical perspectivalism, which maintains that all empirically meaningful descriptions must be relativized to a perspective. I argue that scientific evidence and philosophical considerations support moderate physical perspectivalism over strong physical perspectivalism. In particular, motivations connected to epistemic humility and the social nature of science are more compatible with the moderate approach.

Comments

This article was originally published in Philosophy of Science, volume 92, issue 3, in 2025. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2024.73

Recommended Citation

Adlam, Emily. “Moderate Physical Perspectivalism.” Philosophy of Science 92.3 (2025): 624–645. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2024.73

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

The author

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.