Document Type
Article
Publication Date
12-15-2021
Abstract
Perceptual filling-in for vision is the insertion of visual properties (e.g., color, contour, luminance, or motion) into one’s visual field, when those properties have no corresponding retinal input. This paper introduces and provides preliminary empirical support for filled/non-filled pairs, pairs of images that appear identical, yet differ by amount of filling-in. It is argued that such image pairs are important to the experimental testing of theories of consciousness. We review recent experimental research and conclude that filling-in involves brain activity with relatively high integrated information (Φ) compared to veridical visual perceptions. We then present filled/non-filled pairs as an empirical challenge to the integrated information theory of consciousness, which predicts that phenomenologically identical experiences depend on brain processes with identical Φ.
Recommended Citation
Hopkins, A. R., & McQueen, K. J. (2022). Filled/non-filled pairs: An empirical challenge to the integrated information theory of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 97, 103245. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2021.103245
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
Elsevier
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
Included in
Cognition and Perception Commons, Neurology Commons, Other Psychiatry and Psychology Commons, Psychological Phenomena and Processes Commons
Comments
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Consciousness and Cognition. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Consciousness and Cognition, volume 97, in 2022. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2021.103245
The Creative Commons license below applies only to this version of the article.