Document Type

Article

Publication Date

4-29-2016

Abstract

In this essay, I defend a theory of liability to defensive force. The theory contains two elements. The first is a dual Lockean-inspired condition. The second aims to make this first condition consistent with problems arising from uncertainty. Drawing on recent work by Michael Zimmerman, I argue that the rights-based condition should be made sensitive to the evidence available to defenders.

Comments

This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Social Philosophy and Policy, volume 32, issue 2, in 2016 following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version is available online at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000133

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

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