Document Type
Article
Publication Date
4-29-2016
Abstract
In this essay, I defend a theory of liability to defensive force. The theory contains two elements. The first is a dual Lockean-inspired condition. The second aims to make this first condition consistent with problems arising from uncertainty. Drawing on recent work by Michael Zimmerman, I argue that the rights-based condition should be made sensitive to the evidence available to defenders.
Recommended Citation
van der Vossen, Bas. “Uncertain Rights Against Defense.” Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 32, no. 2, 2016, pp. 129-145. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000133
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
Comments
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Social Philosophy and Policy, volume 32, issue 2, in 2016 following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version is available online at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000133