Document Type
Article
Publication Date
4-17-2015
Abstract
It is argued in this article that legislative vote trading by representatives is both ethically permissible and may be ethically required in many cases. This conclusion is an implication of a thin, general account of representation that requires representatives to vote on the basis of the perceived preferences or interests of their constituents. These special duties arise from a thin account of representation and create a weak, defeasible duty for representatives to engage in what they believe will be beneficial vote trades. After establishing this claim, the article considers two objections to this duty. One is based on equating legislative vote trading with corruption, and the other argues that logrolling violates the ‘duty of civility’. Neither objection undermines the main claim that there is a weak duty to engage in logrolling. Nevertheless, the implications of this duty may be troubling for other reasons.
Recommended Citation
Thrasher, John. "The Ethics of Legislative Vote Trading." Political Studies, vol. 64, no. 3, 2016, pp. 614–629. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.12205
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
The author
Included in
Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Political Theory Commons
Comments
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in journal, volume, in year following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version is available online at DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.12205.