Document Type
Article
Publication Date
5-3-2013
Abstract
John Rawls's transition from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism was driven by his rejection of Theory's account of stability. The key to his later account of stability is the idea of public reason. We see Rawls's account of stability as an attempt to solve a mutual assurance problem. We maintain that Rawls's solution fails because his primary assurance mechanism, in the form of public reason, is fragile. His conception of public reason relies on a condition of consensus that we argue is unrealistic in modern, pluralistic democracies. After rejecting Rawls's conception of public reason, we offer an ‘indirect alternative’ that we believe is much more robust. We cite experimental evidence to back up this claim.
Recommended Citation
Thrasher, John, and Kevin Vallier. “The Fragility of Consensus: Public Reason, Diversity and Stability.” The European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 23, no.4, 2015, pp. 933-954. DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12020
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
Wiley
Included in
Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Family, Life Course, and Society Commons, Other Philosophy Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Other Sociology Commons, Political Theory Commons, Politics and Social Change Commons
Comments
This is the accepted version of the following article:
Thrasher, John, and Kevin Vallier. “The Fragility of Consensus: Public Reason, Diversity and Stability.” The European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 23, no.4, 2015, pp. 933-954. DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12020
which has been published in final form at DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12020. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.