Document Type
Article
Publication Date
12-2025
Abstract
This paper studies trust, reciprocity, and bargaining using a large-scale online experiment in six Latin American countries. Participants were randomly assigned to play trust and ultimatum games under conditions in which the gender of their counterpart was either disclosed or withheld. On average, gender disclosure did not affect behavior. However, disaggregated results show systematic differences. Men displayed higher levels of trust and reciprocity, particularly when interacting with women, and offered larger shares to women in bargaining. Women, by contrast, reciprocated more when paired with men. These findings show how gendered interactions can influence economic behavior, even when counterpart information is conveyed minimally.
Recommended Citation
Bejerano, H., Busso, M., & Santos, J. F. (2025). Strategic interactions and gender cues: Evidence from social preference games. ESI Working Paper 25-17. https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/431/
Comments
ESI Working Paper 25-17