Document Type
Article
Publication Date
12-2025
Abstract
This paper studies trust, reciprocity, and bargaining using a large-scale online experiment conducted in six Latin American countries. Participants played trust and ultimatum games under randomly assigned conditions in which the gender of their counterpart was either disclosed or withheld. On average, disclosing counterpart gender does not yield statistically detectable effects in either game. However, statistically significant differences emerge by participants' own gender: on average men exhibit higher levels of trust, reciprocity, and generosity in bargaining than women. When disaggregating by participant-counterpart gender pairings, point estimates differ in sign across groups but are generally imprecisely estimated, and differences between interacting with male versus female counterparts are generally not statistically distinguishable. Overall, the results are consistent with limited behavioral responses to counterpart gender when gender is conveyed through minimal, text-based cues, notwithstanding clear average gender differences.
Recommended Citation
Bejerano, H., Busso, M., & Santos, J. F. (2025). Strategic interactions and gender cues: Evidence from social preference games. ESI Working Paper 25-17. https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/431/
Comments
ESI Working Paper 25-17