Document Type
Article
Publication Date
3-17-2023
Abstract
Cooperation does not empirically scale when strangers confront indefinitely repeated social dilemmas—despite its incentive-compatibility. Here, we investigate if an intervention can mitigate this problem: expanding the action set with partial cooperation choices. Although standard theory predicts no effect, adding interior choices to a rigid binary-choice game often boosted cooperation and efficiency in the laboratory. Under some conditions, groups of strangers achieved outcomes close to those observed in pairs of partners—where adding interior choices, instead, was inconsequential. This suggests that choice rigidities can hinder long-run cooperation.
Recommended Citation
Camera, G., Kim, J., & Arjona, D. R. (2023). Choice flexibility and long-run cooperation. ESI Working Paper 23-05. https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/385/
Comments
ESI Working Paper 23-05