Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-13-2019
Abstract
Experiments that investigate the spontaneous emergence of money in laboratory societies rely on indefinitely repeated helping games with random matching (Camera et al., 2013; Camera and Casari, 2014). An important open issue is the lack of a general proof of existence of an equilibrium capable of supporting the efficient allocation under private monitoring, without money. Here, we fill this gap by offering a general proof, as well as by characterizing the efficient non-monetary equilibrium. This technique can be extended to study games with simultaneous actions.
Recommended Citation
Camera, G., & Gioffré, A. (2019). Cooperation in indefinitely repeated helping games: existence and characterization. ESI Working Paper 19-28. https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/288/
Comments
ESI Working Paper 19-28
This paper later underwent peer review and was published as:
Camera, G., & Gioffré, A. (2019). Cooperation in indefinitely repeated helping games: existence and characterization. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 200, 1344-1356. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.11.014