More Information, More Ripoffs: Experiments with Public and Private Information in Markets with Asymmetric Information
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2-2010
Abstract
It is well known that asymmetric information can be a catalyst for producing a lemons market. What is much less well known is how different institutional arrangements and their concomitant information conditions affect the lemons outcome. We conduct a laboratory experiment to examine the role that two different types of markets—two-sided multilateral negotiations and posted offers—play in an environment with sufficient conditions to yield a lemons outcome. We also investigate the effect that publicly available prices and advertisements have on buyers and sellers in a posted-offer market.
Recommended Citation
Wilson, B., and Zillante, A. "More Information, More Ripoffs: Experiments with public and private information in markets with asymmetric information." Review of Industrial Organization, 36 (1), p. 1-16, February, 2010.
DOI:10.1007/s11151-010-9240-1
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
Springer
Comments
This article was originally published in Review of Industrial Organization, volume 36, issue 1, in 2010.
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