Document Type

Article

Publication Date

9-15-2016

Abstract

This paper reports the results of laboratory experiments that are designed to test theoretical predictions in a multi-battle contest with value complementarities among the battles. The specific setting is a game of Hex where control of each region is determined by a Tullock contest and the overall winner is determined by the combination of claimed regions. We find that in a game with only a few regions, aggregate behavior across regions is largely consistent with the theoretical predictions. However, examining individual level behavior suggests that bidders are not behaving in accordance with the model, but often pursue specific winning combinations. This intuitive behavioral approach is also found to occur in larger games where the theory is undeveloped.

Comments

NOTICE: this is an early version of a work that was later accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Psychology. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Psychology, volume 63, in 2017. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.09.001

The Creative Commons license below applies only to this version of the article.

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

Elsevier

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

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