Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-10-2019
Abstract
Work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly-used metrics. We created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities. Using two independent experiments we show that, whenever pay for performance is used, manipulation is pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives. By contrast, paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production.
Recommended Citation
Corgnet, B., Martin, L., Ndodjang, P., Sutan, A. (2019). On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting. European Economic Review, 113, 23-45. doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.12.006
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
Elsevier
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
Comments
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in European Economic Review. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in European Economic Review, volume 113, in 2019. DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.12.006
The Creative Commons license below applies only to this version of the article.