In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.
Camera, G., M. Casari, and M. Bigoni (2013). Binding promises and cooperation among strangers. Economics Letters 118, 459-461. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.009
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NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters, volume 118 (2013). Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.009
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