Binding Promises and Cooperation Among Strangers

Authors

Gabriele Camera, Chapman UniversityFollow
Marco Casari, University of BolognaFollow
Maria Bigoni, University of Bologna

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

3-2013

Abstract

In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.

Comments

NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters, volume 118 (2013). Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.009

The Creative Commons license below applies only to this version of the article.

Recommended Citation

Camera, G., M. Casari, and M. Bigoni (2013). Binding promises and cooperation among strangers. Economics Letters 118, 459-461. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.009

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

Elsevier

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.