Revisiting Kin and Ethnic Favoritism in the Bribery Experiment

Authors

Mahsa Akbari, Brandeis University
Duman Bahrami-Rad, Bowdoin College
Erik O. Kimbrough, Chapman UniversityFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

8-30-2025

Abstract

We report a conceptual replication of Akbari et al. (2020), who study the impact of co-ethnicity and kinship on behavior in an experimental “bribery game”. In the game, player A can offer a bribe to B, who can help A by inefficiently transferring resources from passive third-party C. We replicate the finding that by varying the relatedness of A, B and C, we can substantially modulate the willingness of A to offer the bribe and the willingness of B to reciprocate the bribe by harming C. The findings are consistent with theories of kin altruism and ethnic favoritism.

Comments

This article was originally published in Economic Letters, volume 256, in 2025. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112569

Recommended Citation

Akbari, M., Bahrami-Rad, D., & Kimbrough, E. O. (2025). Revisiting kin and ethnic favoritism in the bribery experiment. Economic Letters, 256, 112569. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112569

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

The authors

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.