Standardization and the Stability of Collusion

Authors

Luca Lambertini, University of Bologna
Sougata Poddar, Chapman UniversityFollow
Dan Sasaki, University of Melbourne

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

3-1-1998

Abstract

We characterize the interplay between firms' decision in terms of product standardization and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. We prove the existence of a non-monotone relationship between firms' decision at the product stage and their intertemporal preferences.

Comments

NOTICE: this is an early author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, volume 58, issue 3, in 1998. DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00010-X

The Creative Commons license below applies only to this version of the article.

Recommended Citation

Lambertini, L., Poddar, S., & Sasaki, D. (1998). Standardization and the stability of collusion. Economics Letters, 58(3), 303-310. doi: 10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00010-X

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

Elsevier

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.