"Product Innovation and Stability of Collusion" by Sougata Poddar and Bibhas Saha
 

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2010

Abstract

We study the nature of market competition in relation to stability of collusion in the infinitely repeated play of a twostage game of product innovation and market competition, and show that cooperation in giving R&D efforts is more easily sustained when firms compete in quantity than in price.

Comments

This article was originally published in Economics Bulletin, volume 30, issue 2, in 2010.

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

Economics Bulletin

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