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This study investigates whether agents’ resentment of controls in a gift-exchange game can be effectively mitigated using the strategy method where agents’ effort choices are elicited contingent on all possible contract choices by principals. The results suggest that allowing agents to contemplate contract choices prospectively results in less resentment and that agents exert higher effort than without this “cooling” process.


This article was originally published in Theoretical Economics Letters, volume 8, in 2018. DOI: 10.4236/tel.2018.85060

Peer Reviewed



The authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.



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