Cooler Heads Prevail: An Experimental Study on the “Cooling” Effect of the Strategy Method on Agent Resentment

Authors

Jing L. Davis, Chapman UniversityFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

4-8-2018

Abstract

This study investigates whether agents’ resentment of controls in a gift-exchange game can be effectively mitigated using the strategy method where agents’ effort choices are elicited contingent on all possible contract choices by principals. The results suggest that allowing agents to contemplate contract choices prospectively results in less resentment and that agents exert higher effort than without this “cooling” process.

Comments

This article was originally published in Theoretical Economics Letters, volume 8, in 2018. DOI: 10.4236/tel.2018.85060

Recommended Citation

Davis, J.L. (2018) Cooler Heads Prevail: An Experimental Study on the “Cooling” Effect of the Strategy Method on Agent Resentment. Theoretical Economics Letters, 8, 854-860. https://doi.org/10.4236/tel.2018.85060

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

The authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.