A Reexamination of “The Hidden Return to Incentives”

Authors

Jing Davis, Chapman UniversityFollow
Steven Schwartz, Binghamton University
Richard Young, The Ohio State University

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

8-18-2017

Abstract

Prior literature has observed a “hidden return to incentives” where principals receive more cooperation from agents when formal incentives are available but not used than when not available. Previous experiments are replicated using a gift-exchange rather than a trust game. Hidden returns to incentives are not observed, and in fact the results show the opposite. Suggestions for future research are provided.

Comments

This article was originally published in Theoretical Economics Letters, volume 7, in 2017. DOI:10.4236/tel.2017.75101

Recommended Citation

Davis, J., Schwartz, S. and Young, R. (2017) A Reexamination of “The Hidden Return to Incentives”. Theoretical Economics Letters , 7, 1505-1510. doi: 10.4236/tel.2017.75101

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

The authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.