The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints

Authors

Kai A. Konrad, Max Planck Institute of Tax Law & Public Finance
Dan Kovenock, Chapman UniversityFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2009

Abstract

The formation of an alliance in conflict situations is known to suffer from a collective action problem and from the potential of internal conflict. We show that budget constraints of an intermediate size can overcome this strong disadvantage and explain the formation of alliances.

Comments

NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, volume 103, issue 2, in 2009. DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.01.030

The Creative Commons license below applies only to this version of the article.

Recommended Citation

Konrad, Kai A., and Dan Kovenock. "The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints." Economics Letters 103.2 (2009): 84-86.

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

Elsevier

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.