Document Type
Article
Publication Date
8-27-2014
Abstract
Nachev and Hacker are justified in drawing our attention to the importance of conceptual clarity and coherence as these are too often overshadowed by technical sophistication and methodological rigor, which by themselves count for little. But can a process of “conceptual analysis” actually help us to avoid pitfalls, or does it merely serve to expose those pitfalls in hindsight? What is needed is a method for making scientific arguments formulaic and laying bare the implicit assumptions. We have tools for this, but not everyone uses them.
Recommended Citation
Schurger, A. (2014) Intentions and Voluntary Actions: Reframing the Problem. Cognitive Neuroscience, 5(3-4), 213-214. https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2014.950214
Copyright
Taylor & Francis
Comments
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Cognitive Neuroscience, volume 5, issue 3-4, in 2014, available online at DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2014.950214. It may differ slightly from the final version of record.