Document Type
Article
Publication Date
6-14-2019
Abstract
Should the norms of honor cultures be classified as a variety of morality? In this paper, we address this question by considering various empirical bases on which norms can be taxonomically organised. This question is of interest both as an exercise in philosophy of social science, and for its potential implications in meta-ethical debates. Using recent data from anthropology and evolutionary game theory, we argue that the most productive classification emphasizes the strategic role that moral norms play in generating assurance and stabilizing cooperation. Because honor norms have a similar functional role, this account entails honor norms are indeed a variety of moral norm. We also propose an explanation of why honor norms occur in a relatively unified, phenotypically distinctive cluster, thereby explaining why it is tempting to regard them as taxonomically distinct.
Recommended Citation
Handfield, Toby, and John Thrasher. 201. “Two of a Kind: Are Norms of Honor a Species of Morality?” Biology & Philosophy 34: 39. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-019-9693-z
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
Springer
Included in
Comparative Philosophy Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Other Philosophy Commons, Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons, Social Psychology and Interaction Commons, Sociology of Culture Commons
Comments
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Biology & Philosophy, volume 34, in 2019 following peer review. The final publication may differ and is available at Springer via DOI: 10.1007/s10539-019-9693-z.