In this paper, we generalize the General Lotto game (budget constraints satisfied in expectation) and the Colonel Blotto game (budget constraints hold with probability one) to allow for battlefield valuations that are heterogeneous across battlefields and asymmetric across players, and for the players to have asymmetric resource constraints. We completely characterize Nash equilibrium in the generalized version of the General Lotto game and then show how this characterization can be applied to identify equilibria in the Colonel Blotto version of the game. In both games, we find that there exist sets of non-pathological parameter configurations of positive Lebesgue measure with multiple payoff nonequivalent equilibria.
Kovenock, D., & B. Roberson. (2015). Generalizations of the general lotto and Colonel Blotto games. ESI Working Paper 15-07. Retrieved from http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/156 This paper underwent peer review and was later published as: Kovenock, D., & B. Roberson. (2020). Generalizations of the general lotto and Colonel Blotto games. Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01272-2