We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. WTP is decreasing in the number of potential bidders, but this reduction is less than predicted and small in magnitude.
Aycinena, D., Bejarano, H., & Rentschler, L. (2016). Informed entry in auctions. International Journal of Game Theory, 47(1), 175-205. doi: 10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in International Journal of Game Theory, volume 47, issue 1, in 2017 following peer review. The final publication is available at Springer via DOI:10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9.