Tournaments consisting of iterative matches are a common mechanism for determining how to allocate a prize. For this reason it is important to understand the behavioral as well as the theoretical properties of different tournament structures. Given that laboratory experiments have consistently found high levels of overbidding in contests, one might suspect that double-elimination tournaments would generate substantially more total investment than single-elimination tournaments despite the two types of tournaments generating theoretically equivalent expected aggregate investment. This paper reports a set of laboratory experiments designed to test this comparison. The results indicate that aggregate investment is similar between the two tournaments, despite behavioral differences in bidding strategies.
Deck, C. and Kimbrough, E. (2015). “Single- and Double-Elimination All-Pay Tournaments,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 116, August 2015, pp. 416-429. DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.019
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