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We test for social norms regarding how agents should select between risky prospects for principals, including norms consistent with beneficence and justice propositions from Adam Smith. We elicit norms from subjects serving as "impartial spectator[s]" about choice of risky prospect selected by the agents. We find strong evidence for the existence of norms, consistent with the Smith propositions. Furthermore we find that agents are more likely to select more normative options. In contrast, we find that principals' allocation for bonuses depends on the realization of the risky prospect rather than whether the agents choice was consistent with the norm.
Social norms, Decisions-making for others, Laboratory experiments, Principal-Agent, Decision-making under risk
Econometrics | Economic Theory | Other Economics
Mukherjee, P., & Tracy, J. D. (2022). Data for "Agency, benevolence and justice" [Data set]. https://doi.org/10.36837/chapman.000338
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