Historical Property Rights, Sociality, and the Emergence of Impersonal Exchange in Long-Distance Trade

Authors

Erik O. Kimbrough, Simon Fraser University
Vernon L. Smith, Chapman UniversityFollow
Bart J. Wilson, Chapman UniversityFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2008

Abstract

This laboratory experiment explores the extent to which impersonal exchange emerges from personal exchange with opportunities for long-distance trade. We design a three-commodity production and exchange economy in which agents in three geographically separated villages must develop multilateral exchange networks to import a good only available abroad. For treatments, we induce two distinct institutional histories to investigate how past experience with property rights affects the evolution of specialization and exchange. We find that a history of unenforced property rights hinders our subjects' ability to develop the requisite personal social arrangements to support specialization and effectively exploit impersonal long-distance trade.

Comments

This article was originally published in American Economic Review, volume 98, issue 3, in 2008. DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.3.1009

Recommended Citation

Kimbrough, Erik O., Vernon L. Smith, and Bart J. Wilson. "Historical Property Rights, Sociality, and the Emergence of Impersonal Exchange in Long-Distance Trade." American Economic Review, 98.3 (2008): 1009-39. DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.3.1009

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

American Economic Association