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This paper studies the impact of uncertain demand on firms' capacity decisions when they operate in an oligopolistic environment. We define a two-stage game where firms choose capacity in the first stage without knowing which state of nature is going to realize, and output levels in the second, knowing which state is realized. We prove the existence of a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium at which firms are in excess capacity compared with the capacity they would choose in the Cournot certainty equivalent game.


This is a working version of an article accepted for publication in Economic Theory, volume 10, issue 1, in 1997 following peer review. This article may not exactly replicate the final published version. The final publication is available at Springer via DOI: 10.1007/s001990050150.

Peer Reviewed






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