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Social information “nudges” concerning how others perform typically boost individual performances in experiments with one group reference point. However, in many natural settings, sometimes due to policy, there are several such group reference points. We address the complications that such multiple group social information might introduce through an experiment. The boost to average performance is significant and comparable to the one group case. Between‐group inequality does not change. Individual inequality falls, however, because the boost is largest among the pre‐“nudge” very poor performers. Finally, the boost to average performance is highest when individuals freely choose their group affiliations.


This is the accepted version of the following article:

Hargreaves Heap, S., Ramalingam, A. & Arjona, D. R. (2017). Social information "nudges": An experiment with multiple group references. Southern Economic Journal, 84(1), 348–365.

which has been published in final form at DOI: 10.1002/soej.12210. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.

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Southern Economic Association



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