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We experimentally compare under-revelation of supply and demand across alternative variations of ascending and descending two-sided price clock auctions. We find that buyers reduce demand more when the price is ascending but sellers’ behavior is consistent across clock directions. As a result, the clock price rule has empirical effects on efficiency even though it is theoretically neutral.


This is an earlier version of the following article:

Winn, A. M., Parente, M. L. and Porter, D. (2016), Seller Beware: Supply and Demand Reduction and Price Manipulation in Multiple-Unit Uniform Price Auctions. Southern Economic Journal, 82(3): 760–780. doi: 10.1002/soej.12086

which has been published in final form at DOI: 10.1002/soej.12086. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.

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Southern Economic Association



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