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This study reports on a block of experimental market sessions designed primarily to provide (1) the severest test yet attempted of the equilibrating forces operating in competitive auction markets and (2) a more rigorously controlled test of the Walrasian hypothesis. Some data are also supplied which show the effect of cash payoffs on the equilibrating behavior of such markets; in particular, the effect of full cash payoffs to all successful trading subjects as against payoffs to a subset of such subjects chosen at random.


This article was originally published in Journal of Political Economy, volume 73, issue 4, in 1965.

Peer Reviewed



University of Chicago

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Economics Commons



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