Adaptive rationality: An evolutionary perspective on cognitive bias

Authors

Martie Haselton, University of California - Los Angeles
Gregory A. Bryant, University of California - Los Angeles
Andreas Wilke, University of California - Los Angeles
David Frederick, Chapman UniversityFollow
Andrew Galperin, University of California - Los Angeles
Willem E. Frankenhuis, University of California - Los Angeles
Tyler Moore, University of California - Los Angeles

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2009

Abstract

A casual look at the literature in social cognition reveals a vast collection of biases, errors, violations of rational choice, and failures to maximize utility. One is tempted to draw the conclusion that the human mind is woefully muddled. We present a three-category evolutionary taxonomy of evidence of biases: biases are (a) heuristics, (b) error management effects, or (c) experimental artifacts. We conclude that much of the research on cognitive biases can be profitably reframed and understood in evolutionary terms. An adaptationist perspective suggests that the mind is remarkably well designed for important problems of survival and reproduction, and not fundamentally irrational. Our analysis is not an apologia intended to place the rational mind on a pedestal for admiration. Rather, it promises practical outcomes including a clearer view of the architecture of systems for judgment and decision making, and exposure of clashes between adaptations designed for the ancestral past and the demands of the present.

Comments

This article was originally published in Social Cognition, volume 27, issue 5, in 2009.

Recommended Citation

Haselton, Martie G., et al. (2009). "Adaptive rationality: An evolutionary perspective on cognitive bias." Social Cognition 27(5), 733-763.

Copyright

Guilford Press