Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2010
Abstract
In “Personality Disorders: Moral or Medical Kinds—or Both?” Peter Zachar and Nancy Nyquist Potter (2010) reject any general dichotomy between morality and mental health, and specifically between character vices and personality disorders. In doing so, they provide a nuanced and illuminating discussion that connects Aristotelian virtue ethics to a multidimensional understanding of personality disorders. I share their conviction that dissolving morality–health dichotomies is the starting point for any plausible understanding of human beings (Martin 2006), but I register some qualms about their discussion of responsibility.
Recommended Citation
Martin, Mike W. "Personality disorders and moral responsibility." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 17.2 (2010): 127-129.
DOI:10.1353/ppp.0.0294
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
Johns Hopkins University Press
Included in
Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Personality and Social Contexts Commons, Philosophy of Mind Commons, Psychiatric and Mental Health Commons, Theory and Philosophy Commons
Comments
This article was originally published in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, volume 17, issue 2, in 2010. DOI: 10.1353/ppp.0.0294