Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution

Authors

Erik O. KimbroughFollow
Jared Rubin, Chapman UniversityFollow
Roman M. Sheremeta, Chapman UniversityFollow
Timothy W. Shields, Chapman UniversityFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2013

Abstract

Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by committing to the outcome of a conflict resolution mechanism. Commitment problems are mitigated to a greater extent for groups who opt-in to the conflict resolution mechanism, but only when opting-in is costly. Although conflict rates are higher when opting-in is costly than when it is free or exogenously imposed, commitment problems are greatly reduced amongst those groups who choose to opt-in.

Comments

Working Paper 13-13

Recommended Citation

Kimbrough, E.O., Rubin, J., Sheremeta, R.M., & Shields, T.W. (2013). Commitment problems in conflict resolution. ESI Working Paper 13-11. Retrieved from http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/47

A peer-reviewed version of this paper was later published as:
Kimbrough, E.O., J. Rubin, R.M. Sheremeta, and T.W. Shields. Commitment problems in conflict resolution. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 112 (2015): 33-45.