Fixed Revenue Auctions
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
7-2008
Abstract
In this paper, we study auctions in which the revenue is fixed but the quantity is determined by the auction mechanism. Specifically, we investigate the theory and behavior of English quantity clock, Dutch quantity clock, last-quantity sealed bid, and penultimate-quantity sealed bid auctions. For theoretically equivalent fixed quantity and fixed revenue auctions, we find that fixed revenue auctions are robust to all the previously observed empirical regularities in fixed quantity auctions. (JEL C9, D4, L2)
Recommended Citation
Deck, C. and Wilson, B. "Fixed Revenue Auctions." Economic Inquiry, 46(3), pp. 342-354, July, 2008.
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
Wiley
Comments
This article was originally published in Economic Inquiry, volume 46, issue 3, in 2008.
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