The Number of Active Bidders in Internet Auctions
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
7-2013
Abstract
Internet auctions attract numerous agents, but only a few become active bidders. Under the Independent Private Values Paradigm the valuations of the active bidders form a specific record sequence. This record sequence implies that if the number n of potential bidders is large, the number of active bidders is approximately 2logn, potentially explaining the relative inactivity. Moreover, if the arrival of potential bidders forms a non-homogeneous Poisson process due to a time preference for auctions that are soon to close, then the arrival process of the active bidders is approximately a Poisson arrival process.
Recommended Citation
De Haan, L., de Vries, C., and Zhou, C. "The Number of Active Bidders in Internet Auctions." Journal of Economic Theory, 148(4), p. 1726–1736, 2013.
DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.017
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
Elsevier
Comments
This article was originally published in Journal of Economic Theory, volume 148, issue 4, in 2013.
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