Anonymous Markets and Monetary Trading

Authors

C. D. Aliprantis, Purdue University
Gabriele Camera, Chapman UniversityFollow
D. Puzzello, University of Kentucky

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2007

Abstract

We study infinite-horizon monetary economies characterized by trading frictions that originate from random pairwise meetings, and commitment and enforcement limitations. We prove that introducing occasional trade in 'centralized markets' opens the door to an informal enforcement scheme that sustains a non-monetary efficient allocation. All is required is that trading partners be patient and their actions be observable. We then present a matching environment in which trade may occur in large markets and yet agents' trading paths cross at most once. This allows the construction of models in which infinitely lived agents trade in competitive markets where money plays an essential role.

Comments

NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Monetary Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Monetary Economics, volume 54, issue 7 (2007). DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2006.11.002

The Creative Commons license below applies only to this version of the article.

Recommended Citation

Aliprantis, C.D., G. Camera and D. Puzzello (2007). Anonymous markets and monetary trading. Journal of Monetary Economics 54(7) 1905–1928. doi: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2006.11.002

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

Elsevier

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.