Document Type
Article
Publication Date
12-2013
Abstract
Donations and volunteerism can be conceived as market transactions with a zero explicit price. However, evidence suggests people may not view zero as just another price when it comes to pro-social behavior. Thus, while markets might be expected to increase the supply of assets available to those in need, some worry such financial incentives will crowd out altruistic giving. This paper reports laboratory experiments directly investigating the degree to which market incentives crowd out large, discrete charitable donations in a setting related to deceased organ donation. The results suggest markets increase the supply of assets available to those in need. However, as some critics fear, market incentives disproportionately influence the relatively poor. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Recommended Citation
Deck, C., & Kimbrough, E. O. (2013). Do market incentives crowd out charitable giving?. The Journal of socio-economics, 47, 16-24.
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2013.08.007
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
Elsevier
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
Included in
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Comments
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in The Journal of Socio-economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in The Journal of Socio-economics, volume 47, in 2013. DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2013.08.007
The Creative Commons license below applies only to this version of the article.