A Tractable Analysis of Contagious Equilibria

Authors

Gabriele Camera, Chapman UniversityFollow
Alessandro Gioffré, University of Basel

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-2014

Abstract

This paper studies contagious equilibrium in infinitely repeated matching games. The innovation is to identify a key statistic of contagious punishment that, used together with a recursive formulation, generates tractable closed-form expressions for continuation payoffs, off equilibrium. This allows a transparent characterization of the dynamic incentives created by contagious punishment schemes.

Comments

NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Mathematical Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, volume 50, in 2014. DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.07.003

The Creative Commons license below applies only to this version of the article.

Recommended Citation

Camera, Gabriele, and Alessandro Gioffré. "A tractable analysis of contagious equilibria." Journal of Mathematical Economics 50 (2014): 290-300. doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.07.003

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

Elsevier

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.