Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2014
Abstract
What institutions can sustain cooperation in groups of strangers? Here we study the role of monetary systems. In an experiment, subjects sometimes needed help and sometimes could incur a cost to help an anonymous counterpart. In the absence of money, the intertemporal exchange of help, which could be supported by a norm of community punishment of defectors, did not emerge. Introducing intrinsically worthless tokens substantially altered patterns of behavior. Monetary trade emerged, which increased predictability of play and promoted cooperation when strangers could trade help for a token.
Recommended Citation
Camera, Gabriele, and Marco Casari. 2014. "The Coordination Value of Monetary Exchange: Experimental Evidence." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(1): 290-314. DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.1.290
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
American Economic Association
Comments
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, volume 6, issue 1, 2014 following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version is available at DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.1.290.