Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2013
Abstract
This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a 'guerilla warfare' strategy that stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a 'stochastic complete coverage' strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields. However, we also find interesting behavioral deviations from the theory and discuss their implications.
Recommended Citation
Chowdhury, Subhasish M., Dan Kovenock, and Roman M. Sheremeta. "An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games." Economic Theory 52.3 (2013): 833-861.
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
Springer
Comments
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Economic Theory, volume 52, issue 3, 2013 following peer review. The final publication is available at Springer via DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0670-2.