Document Type
Article
Publication Date
4-2013
Abstract
If, as Hume argues, property is a self-referring custom of a group of people, then property rights depend on how that group forms and orders itself. In this article we investigate how people construct a convention for property in an experiment in which groups of self-selected individuals can migrate between three geographically separate regions. To test a hypothesis of Demsetz's, we vary across two treatments the external benefits of migrating. We find that self-selection has a powerful effect on establishing conventions of property and begetting increases in wealth through exchange and specialization. We also find support for the Demsetz hypothesis.
Recommended Citation
Jaworski, Taylor, and Bart J. Wilson. "Go west young man: self-selection and endogenous property rights." Southern Economic Journal 79.4 (2013): 886-904.
DOI:10.4284/0038-4038-2011.249
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
University of North Carolina
Comments
This article was originally published in Southern Economic Journal, volume 79, issue 4, in 2013. DOI: 10.4284/0038-4038-2011.249