Abstract
The Nixon Administration vastly changed the nature of foreign policy-making within the U.S. bureaucratic offices. The Nixon Administration never executed the terms of their initial Arab-Israeli peace plan, called the Rogers Plan, which Secretary of State William Rogers formulated and negotiated in 1969, and the administration ultimately reformulated the plan into a cease-fire agreement after an increase of Israeli military aggression in 1970. Within the Nixon Administration, the mitigation of the Arab-Israeli conflict became complicated due to the competitive relations between foreign policy-making executive bureaucracies. Under Henry Kissinger the importance of NSC advisement became more influential than it had been before. NSC analyses and actions served as competition to the policies and agendas presented by the Department of State. Due to this, the administration faced the implications of this change in bureaucratic power through its failure to create a comprehensive, innovative policy for the improvement of Arab-Israeli relations.
Recommended Citation
Parish, Brenna
(2015)
""Compromise Becomes the First Casualty": The Effects of the Expanding Role of the National Security Council and Mitigating the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1970,"
Voces Novae: Vol. 7, Article 5.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol7/iss1/5
