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We argue that although objectivist moral attitudes may facilitate cooperation, they are not necessary for the high levels of cooperation in humans. This is implied by evolutionary models that articulate a mechanism underlying Stanford's account, and is also suggested by the ability of merely conventional social norms to explain extreme human behaviors.


This material has been published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, volume 41, in 2018. This version is free to view and download for personal use only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. The final version is available at DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18000080. © Cambridge University Press

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Cambridge University Press



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